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The Internal Challenge to Malaysia
GORDON P. MEANS
Gustavus Adolphus College
ABSTRACT - This paper presents an account of the activities of the major oppos1t1on parties in
Malaysia. Because Indonesia has tried to utilize some opposition parties to bring about the downfall of the present government of Malaysia, special attention has been given to the impact of
Indonesia on the Malaysian political scene.

Indonesia's announced policy of "crushing" the newly
formed Federation of Malaysia has threatened to plunge
Southeast Asia into turmoil and internecine war. The
reasons for Indonesia's campaign against Malaysia have
been examined at some length elsewhere. 1 What has received slight attention heretofore has been the impact of
the dispute upon the internal political situation in Malaysia.
A brief sketch of the political scene in Malaysia must
precede an account of how Indonesia has tried to manipulate Malaysian politics in its attempt to strangle the
new federation in its infancy.
The Federation of Malaysia was formed on September 16, 1963 by the union of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo (Sabah). Malaya is the largest
and most important of these states, and its political and
economic stability is essential for the success of the new
federation. Since 1955, the ruling party in Malaya has
been the Alliance, a coalition of three communal parties
representing the major ethnic communities of Malaya.
The United Malays National Organization (UMNO)
represents the Malays, the Malayan Chinese Association
(MCA) the Chinese, and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) the Indians. While these three parties
have retained their separate identity and communal
structure, their leaders operating within the Alliance coalition negotiate compromises that balance the competing demands of Malaya's multi-racial population . As a
consequence the Alliance Government has taken moderate positions on both communal and economic issues to
obtain wide popular support from all elements of the
population.
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The Alliance policies that have been evolving since
1955 have tended to be along the following lines: First,
extreme communalism in politics has been avoided, but
the Government has recognized a special responsibility
for improving the economic position of the Malays because of their poverty in comparison with the other communities. Besides extensive rural development programs,
"special rights" are available to the Malays in the form
of reserved lands, and special Malay quotas are established for employment in the public services, scholarships, and certain business licenses.
Second, while recognizing the importance of the Chinese, Indian, and European cultural traditions in Malaya, the Government has been placing increased emphasis upon Malay culture and language that are expected, not to replace the other cultural traditions, but
to provide a common bond to unite the nation.
Third, the Government has stimulated substantial economic growth by encouraging private capital investment,
both domestic and foreign.
Fourth, the Government is openly anti-Communist,
having survived a Communist guerrilla insurrection of
about 12 years. Although it permits limited trade with
Communist China, it is fearful that Communist China
will utilize the overseas Chinese to promote revolution
or to extend its dominion.
By its monopoly of the moderate center of the political
stage, the Alliance Government has forced the opposition parties to recruit support among those elements of
the population that reject moderation and are willing instead to divide the country against itself or to look
abroad for support. The main pockets of political opposition have congregated at both extremes of the communal axis of conflict. Chinese chauvinists attack the Government for being too "pro-Malay" and for policies
designed to encourage the Malayan Chinese to forget
their political and historical ties with China. The Government's education, immigration, and foreign policies
have been subjected to a continuing barrage of criticism
from an embittered minority of these Chinese chauvinists, some of whom believe that their political salvation
and the future of "Chinese culture" depend upon the expansion of Communist Chinese influence over Southeast
Asia.
At the other end of the communal spectrum are the
militant Malay nationalists who claim that "Malaya belongs to the Malays" and that all other communities are
"alien." They contend that the non-Malays, regardless
of their loyalties or length of domicile, should not be
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given citizenship or allowed to share equally in the economic wealth of the country. These Malay communal
chauvinists want the Government to pursue more militant "pro-Malay" policies and to give no concessions to
the political and economic demands of the non-Malay
communities. Because the Malays constitute slightly less
than a majority of the population of Malaya, the radical
Malay nationalists have hoped to redraw the political
map in Southeast Asia to tip the political balance in
their favor and, thus to nullify the present power of the
Chinese and Indians. For years these militantly racialist
Malays have been toying with the idea of Melayu Raya
-loosely translated as "Greater Malaysia" but taken to
mean the formation of a Southeast Asian empire embracing all peoples of Malay ethnic stock. The same objective has been promoted by Indonesian nationalists,
but they prefer to call it Indonesia Raya. Presumably,
this empire would incorporate all of Islamic Southeast
Asia, including Indonesia, Malaya, the Borneo states,
the southern part of Thailand, and the southern part of
the Philippine Islands.
Although poles apart, Malay communal chauvinists
and Chinese communal chauvinists have shared some
common objectives that include the defeat or overthrow
of the present Malaysian Government and the disruption
of the Federation of Malaysia; the discrediting of the
parliamentary process that promotes moderation and
compromise; and the encouraging of anti-westernism
tinged with racial overtones. Although holding incompatible views, communalist leaders have cooperated in
their joint attacks upon the Government. The Marxian
model of politics as "class warfare" has proven to be a
convenient meeting ground for communal chauvinists
among the opposition parties, since it facilitates cooperaation among communal extremists by temporarily shifting the axis of political conflict from communalism to
economic grievances. Thus, Malayan politics demonstrates that Marxism can be utilized as a temporary tactical expedient to promote communal objectives, just as
nationalism has at times been utilized to promote Communism.
The political complex of Malayan politics may be illustrated by Figure I that diagrams the relative position
of the Alliance Government and the opposition parties
along the communal and economic axes of political conflict. 2
An important factor in the creation of the Federation
of Malaysia was that such a wider union would retain
approximately the same communal and political balance
as that of Malaya. This was possible because Singapore's
large Chinese majorities could be offset by large majorities of Malays and native peoples in the Borneo states of
Sabah and Sarawak.
The negotiations to create the Malaysian Federation
were exceedingly complicated, since the new union had
to take into account the different cultural ethnic economic, and political interests of each of [he four' units
2
The economic axes on the diagram are not at right angles
to the communal axis because of the greater poverty among the
Malays as compared to non-Malays.
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joining the federation. Since these negotiations were conducted by those who controlled political power in each
of these states, the final Malaysia Agreement reflects the
points of view of the majority party or the majority coalition in each constituent state. Even though the major
opposition parties were consulted during the negotiations, the opposition parties have generally opposed Malaysia as finally constituted because their views were not
given higher priority, and because the majority parties
strengthened their political position by the new union.
Although the new federation was negotiated with the
view to creating a minimum political disturbance in each
of the constituent states, it has had the effect of exacerbating communalism among the opposition parties because it weakened their power and presented a direct
challenge to the hopes of some opposition leaders for
fundamental realignments in Southeast Asia.
Table I. Communal Distribution in Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak,
Sabah and Malaysia
Chinese

Indians

Others

49.8%
13.6%
68.1%
68.2%

37.1%
75.1%
30.7%
23.1%

II.I%
8.6%
0.3%
0.7%

2.0%
2.7%
0.8%
8.0%

46.5%

42.0%

9.3%

2.2%

Malaysiansa

Malaya . . .......
Singapore .... . ...
Sarawak . . . . . . . . .
Sabah . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federation of
Malaysia total . . . ..

.

"The category "Malaysians" includes Malays and indigenous
tribal peoples, on the assumption that their politiool and com ·
munal interests are very similar. However, there are important
differences which undermine this assumption when certain political issues are at stake.
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A review of some of the activities of the more important opposition parties will illustrate some of the communal tensions that have surfaced since the formation of
Malaysia.
The Pao-Malayan Islamic Party l PMIP) is the strongest and most effective spokesman for Malay communalism. Its leader, Dr. Burhanuddin, was included in the
Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee that drew
up the first proposals for Malaysia. After five months of
silence, the PMIP finally announced its opposition to the
formation of Malaysia because Indonesia and the Philippines were not included. In criticizing government policy,
the PMIP tried to impress upon the Malays that the new
union would place them in a minority and not "safeguard their interests." The Malay communalist position
of the PMIP was strengthened in late 1962 when the
Alliance Government removed its Minister for Agriculture and Cooperatives, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, because
he persistently administered his department with such a
"pro-Malay" bias that the communal compromises of
the Alliance were being imperiled. Abdul Aziz later tried
to found a new party based on his personal following
among the Malay peasantry, but ultimately his National
Convention Party became little more than an ancillary
to the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party in espousing Malay
communalism and the ideas of Melayu Raya.
Another opposition party in Malaya is the Socialist
Front. It is a coalition of two separate parties of which
the largest is the Labour Party of Malaya, which is primarily Chinese-led and has close ties with some of the
larger unions in the country. In 1957 it joined forces
with a radical left-wing Malay party called Party Ra'ayat.
The latter was led by Ahmad Boestamam who had led
a revolutionary Malay youth organization that was
banned in 1947 by the British. He is widely known for
his Indonesian sympathies and for his militant approach
to politics. In order to hold the Socialist Front together,
communal issues were ignored or glossed over. Economic
grievances and anti-western anti-imperialism were
stressed instead. The two parties agreed to oppose Malaysia "because of the way it was implemented," thus
avoiding the problem of offering specific alternatives.
Even so, the Socialist Front has suffered from grave internal stresses, particularly since the non-Malay political
following of the Labour Party has been so much larger
than Party Ra'ayat's Malay support.
The extreme chauvinist and Communist-inspired Chinese are scattered and are not too effective in Malaya.
However, in Singapore they are concentrated in two opposition parties - the Barisan Sosialis and the United
People's Party. Since 1961 these two parties have been
engaged in an extended campaign to block or break up
Malaysia, and to defeat or overthrow the relatively noncommunal Peoples Action Party, which has retained
power in Singapore since 1959 despite its near defeat in
1961 when the PAP split and its legislative majorities
were reduced to the minimum. Shortly after the formation of Malaysia, elections were held in Singapore and
the Peoples Action Party was returned to power, polling
Journal of, Volume Thirty-three, No. 2, 1966

47 per cent, whlle the remainder of the vote was split
among pro- and anti-Malaysia opposition parties (see
Table 2).
Table 2. Party Distribution in Singapore Legislative Assembly
Before and After September 1963 Elections

Peoples Action Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barisan Sosialis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United People's Party . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Singapore Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tndependents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Before

After

25
14
2
7
2

37
13

I

In Malaya the Government also decided to renew its
mandate, confident that it would secure popular support
despite the severity of Indonesia's attacks against Malaysia. The election held in April 1964 resulted in increased
majorities for the Alliance. 4 By adding the seats from
Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah to the Malaysian Parliament, the Alliance held 125 seats out of a total of 159,
while only 14 seats were held by opposition parties that
were definitely " anti-Malaysia."
Table 3. Parliamentary and State Elections in Malaya,
1959 and 1964
1964

1959
Parli a ment

Alliance ... . .... . . .. . ' . . 74
Pan-Malayan Tslamic Party . 13
Party Negara .... .. . . . . . . I
Socialist Front . . . . . . . . . . 8
4
Peoples Progressive Party.
Malayan Party . . . . . . . . . . I
United Democratic Party . .
Peoples Action Party .. ...
Independents . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

St a te

Pa rl!ament

207
42
4
16

89

8

2

9

2

State

241
25

7
5
4

5

The election results throughout Malaysia made the
more extremist opposition politicians more desperate
than ever; the results provided ample evidence that the
governments in these states had gained general popular
support for the Malaysian Federation and had been able
to capitalize on a growing sense of Malaysian nationalism that was being generated in large measure by the
severity of Indonesia's military and economic offensive
against Malaysia.
The anti-Malaysia opposition began to take desperate
action even before Malaysia was formed. In February
1963 the Governments of Malaya and Singapore, and
the British authorities, which were then still in control
of internal security in Singapore, obtained evidence that
Communist extremists in Singapore would try to join
forces with Indonesia to make havoc, to attempt the overthrow of the Singapore Government, and to block the
formation of Malaysia. The Government used its emergency powers to arrest 107 pro-Communist and profndonesi an politicians in Singapore, including some
'The party distribution in Parliament including all the states
of Malaysia was as follows : Alliance, 125; Peoples Action Party,
13; Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, 9; Barisan Sosialis, 3; Peoples
Progressive Pa rty , 2; Socialist Front, 2; Sarawak United Peoples
Party, 3; Independent. I.
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prominent figures in the Barisan Sosialis Party, as well
as the Chairman of Party Rakyat Singapore. Shortly
thereafter, Ahmad Boestamam, the leader of Malaya's
Party Ra'ayat was also arrested for planning subversive
activities with Indonesian cooperation. In prison, Boestamam made the following statement that was later released by the Government: "I am prepared to cooperate
with the Communists to achieve my long-term plan to
unite Indonesia, the Philippines, the Borneo territories,
South Thailand, Malaya and Singapore into a greater
Malaysia state. . . . In other words, I shall use the
Communists, but I shall not be indebted to them." It is
hardly necessary to add that the Communists and the
extreme Chinese chauvinists have been following the
same tactic, but with a different end in mind.
Capitalizing on the disillusionment and frustrations of
pro-Indonesian opposition leaders, Indonesia began direct involvement in Malayan politics on an increasing
scale after 1963. During the 1964 Malayan election campaign Indonesia gave secret financial assistance to the
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party and Party Ra'ayat amounting
to about M$250,000. After the overwhelming Alliance
victory, Indonesian secret agents began to press for the
formation of a "Malayan Government in Exile" to be
formed by as many opposition leaders as could be persuaded to leave the country. Such a move was to be coordinated with internal disorders and, hopefully, the formation of anti-government guerrilla forces in Malaya
aided by Indonesian arms and "volunteers." The pattern
was to be somewhat similar to the one that had been followed during the Indonesian-inspired Brunei revolution
of January 1962, which, although it failed, resulted in
the formation of an exile "Government of Kalimantan
Utara" in Jakarta and claimed authority over the Borneo
states.
The planned disorders were touched off in Singapore
in July 1964 with the apparent cooperation of Communist-leaning Chinese extremists and militant pro-Indonesian Malays. Both elements hoped to capitalize on the
chaos that was expected to follow. In a Machiavellian
maneuver, racial rioting was triggered in Singapore when
a small bomb was tossed into a Muslim procession celebrating the Prophet Mohammed's birthday. About a dozen persons were killed and about 400 were wounded in
the ensuing racial clashes between Malays and Chinese.
Singapore was placed under strict curfew for several
weeks while government-sponsored "goodwill committees" tried to reduce communal tensions.
Shortly after the Singapore rioting, in August and September, Indonesian guerrillas were landed by boat and
air-dropped into southern Malaya. Indonesian agents
also succeeded in persuading pro-Indonesian opposition
leaders to prepare to form a "Malayan Government in
Exile" in order to lend credence to Indonesia's contention that Malaysia was a "neo-colonialist plot" imposed
upon the people against their will. However, before these
Malay opposition leaders could leave the country, the
police intercepted a large number of their secret communications to and from Indonesian agents. In late Jan144

uary 1965, the top leaders of Malay communal extremism were arrested. The list included Dr. Burhanuddin,
President of the PMIP; Dato Raja Abu Hanifah, ViceChairman of the PMIP; Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, President
of the National Convention Party; Ishak bin Haji Mohamed, former Chairman of the Socialist Front; and V.
David, former Socialist Front Member of Parliament.
Ahmad Boestamam, President of Party Ra'ayat, had been
imprisoned earlier.
The evidence against these individuals was published
in a parliamentary white paper, which, if accurate, clearly
demonstrated that the radical Malay opposition parties
had been engaged in a series of acts that were nothing
short of treason. Despite the evidence, no political parties
were declared illegal, and action has been taken only
against individuals for their activities.
These events illustrate that the fundamental problems
of nation-building involve more than the creation of
stable majorities at the polls. Extremist minorities, ever
ready to resort to violence, pose a serious threat in any
society, but this is especially true in the emerging states
of Asia and Africa. Under these circumstances, democracy and constitutional order are subject to serious threats
from at least two quarters: First, from opposition parties
willing to use a political crisis and foreign support in the
pursuit of political power heretofore denied at the polls;
and, second, from a government that could become so
preoccupied with meeting a crisis that it might decide
democracy and constitutional processes are luxuries
which cannot be tolerated during such a national emergency. Even in an established and stable country the distinction between a "loyal opposition" and a "disloyal opposition" is difficult to make with precision. In a country only just beginning the process of nation-building,
such a distinction is even more uncertain and, in any
case, too subtle to be appreciated by most of the population who have yet to think in terms of loyalty to the
nation-state "Malaysia."
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